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The estimated impacts, benefits, and costs of legalizing slot machines in 
Maryland are analyzed.  The analysis provides insight into the components 
and the total net benefits to the state and its citizens, the role of uncertainty, 
distributional impacts, and a basic tax alternative.  The results forecast net 
benefits for Maryland both in comparison to doing nothing and in 
comparison to raising an equivalent amount in taxes.  However, if revenue 
raised from the lower income population has a higher social cost, then 
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Legalized gambling in many forms has spread among states and tribes in part due to its 
ability to raise revenue for these governments.  At the same time, numerous concerns 
exist about legalizing gambling such as the potential for increased crime, reduced 
productivity, domestic and personal problems among other ills that have been 
investigated.  Conceptually, many issues in regional public economics and benefit-cost 
analysis are illustrated by an analysis of gambling; among them the role of government 
revenue, social costs based on the actions of non-normal gamblers, whether or how 
employment benefits are included, distributional impacts, uncertainty about quantitative 
measures, and the nature of alternative projects.  While these issues may appear in impact 
reports prepared for policy debate, less frequently are impact analyses extended into a 
social benefit-cost analysis.   
 
This paper presents a forecast of the social benefits and costs of a policy to introduce 
video lottery terminals, hereafter VLTs or slots, into the State of Maryland.  The analysis 
is prospective and based on an impact analysis generated prior to the statewide vote on 
the legality of slots in 2008 (Shinogle, et al. 2008).  Although new information and 
macro-economics conditions have arrived since the initial study and vote, an analysis as 
of the time of the vote is believed useful to establish a baseline and to demonstrate 
analytical issues in the prospective benefit-cost analysis of a gambling policy.  
 
The vote to legalize VLTs in Maryland defined a state limited program where five sites 
would be licensed in the state with a total of 15,000 slot machines (DLS 2008).  
Legalized gambling exists in several neighboring states.  The explicit purpose of the 
legislation was to raise funds for a variety of purposes such as higher education, 
horseracing, local government, small, minority and women-owned accounts, and the   3 
horse racing industry.  The analysis here focuses on the cost of raising the desired funds 
without analyzing the purpose to which the funds are spent.  Although the basic analysis 
compares Maryland with and without the slots, an alternative is analyzed that raises the 
net government funds through state taxation. 
Although there are many intricacies involved in assessing the benefits and costs of 
gambling, the methodological approach taken here is to:  1)  use data generated or 
available at the time of the vote, 2) initially apply benefit-cost principles based on 
guidance from the federal government (OMB 2003) as adapted for a regional instead of a 
national analysis as well as guidance from a leading text (Boardman, et al. 2006; Grinols 
2004), and 3) investigate frontier issues raised by the initial analysis.   
 
Further, this case study is an attempt to see if a relatively low cost benefit-cost analysis 
can be informative in ways that impact analyses may not be.  The cost of carrying out 
benefit-cost analyses has been an issue in some settings in the United States, in part 
because the analysis of major federal regulations may incur expenditures of a million 
dollars or more and may cause real or perceived delays in the process.  This case study 
should be viewed as being small scale, generally using costs and benefits that are 
transferred from other settings or produced by other authors for this setting in order to 




Existing guidance is relatively clear on the general categories in the absence of 
uncertainty for a benefit-cost analysis:  changes in the four elements of consumer surplus, 
producer surplus, government revenues, and externalities where it is recognized that 
when changes in government revenue is identified, then the surplus measures are net of 
that revenue transfer to government (Boardman, et al.; Zerbe and Dively,  1994).  The 
challenge is typically to assign and assess the impacts of a particular policy in the 
appropriate categories without double-counting or other major issues of mis-
measurement.  In the context of gambling, Grinols (p. 105) has developed a general 
equilibrium expenditure function approach in which he incorporates distance to a   4 
gambling site and an economy wide set of goods to identify an expanded set of impacts 
involving:  change in profit, change in taxes, consumer surplus, distance consumer 
surplus, capital gains, public good effects (both benefits and costs), transaction effects 
(such as unemployment), and externality costs.  His formulation may not be 
fundamentally different from the more general case as “distance consumer surplus” is 
distinguished from standard consumer surplus primarily because distance is modeled as 
not affecting the price of gambling.  Other effects, such as employment effects and 
capital gains may be viewed as being explicit about temporal and spatial constraints 
which may lead to employment effects or changes in asset value (such as property values) 
depending on the geographic area being studied and whether significant unemployment 
exists at a particular time (Haveman and Krutilla 1967; Boardman et al.).  None-the-less, 
this analysis owes much to Grinol’s framing with consumer benefits from reduced 
distance to a gambling location being a primary determinant of consumer benefits.  
Ultimately however, the benefit-cost accounting statement will follow the four categories 
of consumer and producer surplus, change in government revenue, and externalities.   
   
The analysis to follow presents a sequence of increasing complexity.  The first results 
will discuss benefits and costs to Maryland without secondary effects such as induced 
changes in taxes or benefits from employing the previously unemployed, and secondly, 
will include such effects.  Consequently, this is a regional, state based benefit-cost study 
where residents of Maryland have standing.  Other potential benefits or costs, such as 
those for a citizen of DC who has distance benefits from closer proximity to gambling in 
Maryland, or costs, such as problem gambler in Virginia, do not count.  Similarly, 
impacts on producers such as profits exported from the state should not count (Grinols, 
Appendix).  Regarding timing, the analysis focuses on the steady-state annual benefits at 
full implementation (Shinogle, et al.).    
 
Further analyses integrate uncertainty in the estimates as many outcomes, such as 
external costs associated with gamblers, revenue estimates, and secondary effects.  The 
general approach is to use expected values for point estimates the unknown parameters 
and to use the expected ex-post amount lost as a measure of willingness to pay for the   5 
chance to gamble on the part of risk-loving individuals.  Uncertainty analysis is carried 
using a Monte Carlo simulation using statistical distributions based on the author’s 
judgment of the literature as will be specified in each section.    
Two final analyses consider an adjustment for “non-normal” preferences and for 
distributional impacts.  Considerable attention has been devoted to modifying the welfare 
of the observed behavior of an addict to correspond to that of a “normal” person 
(Boardman, et al. 2006; Weimer, Vining and Thomas 2009; Grinols 2004).  An extension 
of the basic analysis will consider the effect of modifying the benefits to problem and 
pathological gamblers (as defined in the literature) based on the preferences of normal 
gamblers.  An analysis that investigates distributional impacts based on who tends to 
gamble and their location in the income distribution is also presented.  Few benefit-cost 
analyses consider this factor although it is suggested in governmental guidance. 
 
DATA AND RESULTS 
 
Each model builds using the components of changes in government revenue, in consumer 
surplus (including distance benefits) and producer surplus (after taxes),  and change in 
externalities with data based on Shinogle, et al. (2008) unless otherwise indicated.  The 
point estimate and any statistical distribution used in the uncertainty analysis are 
discussed with each model.  All values are in 2008 dollars unless noted.  Different 
readers may infer different estimates from information in Shinogle, et al..  For instance, 
that report discussed a forecast of total revenue from slots generated by a state agency 
(DLS) but then provided sensitivity analysis leading to three additional estimates, termed 
high, medium, and low (Shinogle, et al. p. 1-10).  This report uses all four estimates to 
form an expected value.   
 
Direct effects at full implementation  
 
Table I identifies the benefit and cost categories and presents the point estimates for the 
basic results, results that include secondary impacts, and those that include uncertainty in 
the parameters.  Each element of Table 1 is discussed below with later analyses building   6 
upon these items.  The direct impacts model includes the core elements of the direct 
change in government revenue taking into account only expected governmental costs of 
implementation, the estimated change in consumer benefits due to closer gambling 
locations, and the direct change in producer surplus.  
 
Change in Government Revenue  
 In the direct analysis, the change in government revenue is the expected steady state 
government revenue and was the focus of much of the policy discussion.  The State 
estimated the gross total expected revenue as $1,362 million yielding $913 million in 
gross state revenues given the state share (DLS 2008; Shinogle, et al. p. 8).   Shinogle, et 
al. investigated high, medium, and low alternative gross revenue assumptions of $1,375; 
$1,031; and $688 million respectively to which the various percentages can be applied for 
the government revenue, most importantly that two-thirds of the gross revenue is 
received by the state and the remaining going to the operator.   Following typical 
guidance (Arrow et al. 1996; OMB 2003), the expected value of the four estimates, 
$1,114,  is used as a point estimate.   It is unclear how best to capture additional 
information about the statistical distribution, whether through four discrete alternatives or 
to smooth the estimates in some way.  What is used in this analysis is a triangular 
distribution which is continuous with the most likely case being the mean of the four 
estimates ($1,114 million) and with upper and lower bounds as identified and the state 
gross revenues equal to two-thirds of the total gross revenues.  Governmental expenses 
identified in the legislation as specific percentages of government revenue are included 
explicitly as costs in later sections. 
 
Producer surplus after taxes:  Gambling in Maryland will be state regulated with limited 
entry in the state and competition from surrounding states.  Maryland planned to extract a 
relatively large share of after payout revenues, 67 percent, compared to neighboring 
states that extract from 42 to 48 percent (Shinogle, et al. p. 15).  The authors expectation 
is that this requires the state to extract essentially all the producer surplus over a normal 
rate of return to capital and entrepreneurial effort.  At the same time, the legislative 
reports and data focus on VLT revenue and not on what may be the consolidated profits   7 
of operators.  Operators may open other businesses such as restaurants which take 
advantage of the limited entry into the VLT business.  This may generate producer 
surplus for Maryland from out of state gamblers and have some substitution effects 
(discussed in the next section) on other retail opportunities. 
 







Basic Model I Mil 2008 $ Mil 2008 $ Mil 2008 $
Benefits      
Change Gov't Revenue $746   $746 746
Change G: Annual fee for 
Prob. Gamb $6 $6 6
Change PS: MD Profits $29   $29 29
Change CS: Consumer 
distance $25   $25 25
New sales tax $2 2
Unemployment effects $0 0
Welfare benefits $782 Modified Benefits $809 809
Costs
Change Gov Rev (2% 
Admin) $22   $22 22
Change Gov Rev: other cost $39   $39 39
External and addictive costs $428   $428 428
  Loss in lottery sales 57 57
Loss in other taxes  28 28
Change other MD CS or PS 162 162
Welfare costs $489 Modified Costs $735 735
Annual Net Benefits $293 Modified Net Ben $74 73
Specific Secondary  effects
 
 
The point estimate used for long term producer surplus is 8 percent of the VLT operating 
revenues private operators received from the state based on the net income after taxes, 
depreciation, and before losses of all U.S. corporations in 2006 (US Census 2010).   
There is little in the secondary literature to guide uncertainty analysis about the 
appropriate revenue data to use or the rate in a regulated setting.  Grinols uses twenty 
percent of gross revenue as the gross profit to include depreciation, interest, and profit in 
his example of the regional effect of gambling.  If all firms are incorporated outside   8 
Maryland, then the producer surplus within Maryland would be zero.  Consequently, the 
distribution used for producer surplus as a percentage of private VLT income is triangular 
with a lower bound of zero, a mode of 8 percent and a maximum of 20 percent. 
 
Consumer benefit:  Grinols distinguishes a consumer benefit based on reduced distance to 
gambling for an average consumer from a consumer benefit due to a price change in the 
more traditional consumer surplus.  The distance benefit is estimated by Grinols using a 
functional form for utility that incorporates an intensity of gambling into a utility function 
to model both the number of visits and expenditures and distance to the gambling site.    
Shinogle, et al. (p. 11-12) report a distance consumer benefit of $25 million based on 
Grinols and the estimated average change in distance from 75 to 20 miles for gamblers in 
Maryland who may have previously gambles in the neighboring states of Pennsylvania, 
Delaware and West Virginia.   
 
These distance benefits are approximations in several ways.  The preferred interpolation 
is not clear for the assumed change in distance, the average distance may be different, 
and a recalculation of the 2008 data indicates the number may be less per person but 
larger than the $25 million for the entire population.  For uncertainty purposes in later 
estimation, the distribution of distance consumer benefit has a most likely value of $40 
million, a minimum of $25 million and a maximum of $100 million as the average 
distance was decreased to 10 miles and the value was applied to all adults as was 
typically although not universally identified in Grinols instead of to an expected number 
of gamblers. 
 
Government expenses:  Maryland legislation estimated that state costs would be 4.8 
percent of total gross revenues (prior to payout to operators).  The funding for these costs 
was to be split with two percent from VLT revenue and 2.8 percent from general funds.  
These costs are included as part of the direct “net” cost to government.  On costs drawn 
from the general funds, a marginal excess burden of taxation of twenty-five percent is 
applied (Boardman, et al.; Grinols).  The distribution of these costs is here driven by 
uncertainty in the gross revenues with the percentages remaining constant.   9 
 
Problem and pathological gamblers (external and addictive impacts):  Some gamblers 
develop an addiction to gambling that may lead to a number of self and relationship 
damaging actions.  The literature, as summarized by Shinogle et al. (p. 12-14), identified 
pathological gamblers as the most at risk for addiction and problem gamblers as the next 
at risk.  Numerous problems, both to themselves and to society have been estimated 
including lost productivity, crime, illness, fraud and so on.  In effect, estimates in this 
area are a “bottom up” approach to enumerate impacts that are both external to the 
problem and pathological gamblers and some of which are likely internal.  Although a 
later model will briefly discuss a different approach based on addictive preferences, this 
category of impact is thought to include both external effects and at least some of the 
components of what a problem and pathological gambler might be willing to pay to avoid 
their condition.  While not well addressed in the gambling literature, future research 
could investigate what elements of this category are truly external costs, what are 
transfers, and what are internal to the gambler’s decision.  
 
Estimates of the prevalence and value of these effects exist although the value is quite 
uncertain as the categories of impact and the marginal effect of gambling availability is 
poorly known.  Shinogle (p. 14) reports a range of estimates for the incremental cost of 
problem and pathological gamblers in Maryland as being between $228.3 and $627.5 
million and so the expected value, $428 million, is used as the point estimate while 
uncertainty is modeled as a uniform distribution for the range.   
 
Discussion of results:  Direct Effects   
 
The result of the direct effect model is estimated net benefits of about $300 million in 
2008 dollars
1.  The key driver of the benefits is the government revenue although the 
estimated “external” costs due to problem and pathological gamblers are a substantial 
offset.  Other elements, such as administrative costs, consumer benefits, producer surplus, 
                                                 
1 These net benefit would be about $200 million higher if the state estimate for projected revenues was used 
in place of the expected value of the state and the MIPAR generated estimates.   10 
and government fee revenue are relatively small being on the order of tens of millions of 
dollars instead of hundreds of millions as is the case for government revenues and 
external costs due to problem and pathological gamblers.  The conclusion is that the 
direct effects, based on expected value point estimates, indicate a positive net benefit for 
Maryland due to VLTs. 
 
Direct and indirect (secondary) effects, point estimates 
 
This model adds what are generally considered the secondary, indirect, or general 
equilibrium effects to the core elements of the direct effect model.  Some of these 
possible effects, such as any employment effects, are an important part of the policy 
debate but are generally, although not always, excluded from a benefit-cost analysis for 
reasons explained below.  Each component that differs from the direct effects model is 
summarized below followed by a discussion of the results. 
 
Employment of the unemployed:  The initial estimates reported by Shinogle, et al. (p. 12) 
suggest that full employment existed in Maryland at the time and so there would no direct 
(or indirect) benefits related to employing the unemployed.   Consequently the point 
estimate for a secondary benefit for the unemployed is zero which is also consistent with 
federal and textbook guidelines (OMB 2003; Boardman, et al.).  However, in times of 
significant unemployment, a social benefit may exist over and above the reservation 
wage of hiring an unemployed person (Boardman, et al.; Haveman and Krutilla 1967).  In 
the later uncertainty analysis, some potential for hiring the unemployed exists.  The 
Maryland unemployment rate in late 2009 through 2010 was about 7 percent.  In the 
uncertainty analysis here, the probability of an unemployment benefit was modeled as 
being driven by an ad-hoc probability model of hiring an unemployed person, times a 
social value for employing unemployed labor, times the size of the payroll.  The assumed 
probability of hiring an unemployed person has its most likely value at 0 and increases 
continuously to 1; this distribution has a mean value of one-third.  The probability of  the 
unemployment benefit generated from that distribution is then multiplied times one-half 
of the estimated payroll, a proportion of payroll that results when the reservation wage   11 
for the unemployed is thought to range randomly between zero and the observed wage 
(Boardman, et al. p. 101).  The VLT operator’s payroll was estimated as one third of the 
casino VLT expenditures (Grinols).  There is no explicit multiplier effect although the 
proportion of unemployed hired could contain elements of such an effect. 
 
Changes in other taxes: As an important policy issue in regional analysis is the net effect 
on taxes.  The state legislative services (DLS) and Shingole, et al. included estimates of 
changes in other state revenue.  The largest of these are estimated reductions in existing 
lottery income and the substitution effect of consumer and other expenditures in 
Maryland shifting from an existing taxable activity into a differently taxed activity, VLTs.  
Modest increases were estimated for some types of sales taxes.  The point estimates are 
as reported in Shinogle, et al., in the case of lottery sales as an absolute dollar amounts 
and in the case of sales taxes, as 2.5 percent of gross VLT revenue.  In the latter case, the 
uncertainty analysis links the loss in tax income to the uncertain change in total revenues. 
 
Changes in other consumer and producer surplus:  Including changes in related markets 
is a difficult conceptual and empirical issue for benefit-cost analysis.  Existing guidance, 
as with unemployment, is to exclude such impacts.  For instance, a leading textbook 
states “We can, and indeed, should ignore impacts in undistorted secondary markets as 
long as changes in social surplus in the primary market resulting from government 
projects are measured and prices in the secondary markets do not change” (Boardman, et 
al. p. 113).  Distinguishing partial and general equilibrium effects can be a significant 
effort as illustrated by recent research on the “partial” and “full” excess burden of 
taxation (Goulder and Willisams 2003).   However, two elements of the VLT context 
suggest that some macroeconomic impact is likely appropriate.  First, the state and 
Shinogle et al. expend effort to consider the change in taxes and other state revenue.  In a 
partial equilibrium setting, it is difficult to consider that tax revenues would change 
without some corresponding change in surplus measures.   In addition, the regional 
impact and gambling literature is concerned about the source of the change in 
government revenues.  Common terms include “recaptured” and “cannibalized” dollars 
where recaptured dollars are those that were previously spent, in this case by Marylanders,   12 
on gambling out of state that will be brought back into the state in some proportion.  
Cannibalized dollars are those expenditures that were already occurring in Maryland and 
now shifted into gambling which for Marylanders may have a subtle effect based on 
differential tax and consumer surplus across expenditure categories.  For out-of-state 
gamblers coming into Maryland, some fraction of their expenditures might have been 
spent in Maryland in any event.  For instance, Grinols adjusts revenue for such 
cannibalized dollars.  In the Shinogle et al. report, this adjustment was part of the 
justification for lower VLT revenue forecasts based on lower rates of recapture dollars.   
 
Consequently, for logical consistency with the estimated reduction in taxes and with 
regard to the literature, an indirect cost is associated with changes in consumer and 
producer surplus.  In the absence of information about aggregate supply and demand 
responsiveness, which was not discussed in any of the existing reports, it is not possible 
with available data to directly link the change in tax revenues to changes in surplus 
measures.  Instead, the expected adjustment for changes (losses) in indirect surplus is 
calibrated to be equal to an estimate of the proportion, 33 percent, of the change in 
government revenue generated by expanded gambling of Marylanders (DLS).  This may 
be viewed as a conservative assumption, on very little analytical basis, as this entirely 
offsets the shift in spending to gambling among Marylanders, in effect creating a surplus 
neutral effect in Maryland. This estimate of shifted surplus, at $210 million, is over twice 
the estimated loss in tax and lottery revenue.  The statistical distribution for this value is 
determined by the uncertainty of total revenue, a uniform random shift factor between 0 
and 100 (the point estimate is 100 percent shifting), and a Maryland proportion of slots 
revenue that is triangularly distributed with a low of 25 percent, mode of 33 percent and 
high of 50 percent (the mean is then 36 percent).   
 
Discussion of results:  Secondary effects model 
 
Including point estimates of the secondary effects has a substantial effect on the 
estimated net benefits, reducing them by almost $250 million to $74 million.  Almost all 
of this adjustment is the result of the assumed shifts within Maryland in the surplus   13 
measures for other markets and the loss of government revenue in other markets.  As the 
point estimate of unemployment benefits is zero, unemployment benefits have no effect 
on the point estimate of this model.  Although net benefits are reduced they remain 
positive so that the conclusion of this extended model is that Maryland would benefit due 
to introducing VLTs. 
 
Uncertainty analysis through Monte Carlo simulation  
 
These results include the statistical distributions discussed in the benefit and cost 
categories to the model with secondary impacts.   The distributions are used as the basis 
for 10,000 trials in a Monte Carlo simulation which produces an extended sensitivity 
analysis compared to considering just a few alternatives
2. For instance, the possible 
benefits from hiring the unemployed now appear in some results as do the Shinogle, et al. 
estimates of lower forecasted income.   
 
Two sets of simulation results are reported.  The first represents standard practice by 
including distributions for all the impact parameters of the model.  The second includes 
an additional random error term associated with model fit (Farrow 2009).   The 
distinction between the two models is that the first captures the effect of variability in the 
impacts, the second captures more fundamental uncertainty about how well the model fits 
the data.   
 
The second model that includes uncertainty is worthy of additional discussion.  The error 
augmented model  is based on adding a distribution for a random error term to the basic 
Monte Carlo model.   The estimation procedure described in Farrow (2009) is used here 
which is based on a subjective estimate of the accuracy of the overall model using a fit 
index ranging from 0 to 1 where 1 is a perfect fit.   A value of .4 is used here to indicate 
that the model contains substantial uncertainty such that about the 40 percent of the true 
variability, analogous to R
2, is captured in the model.  This uncertainty can come through 
the impact of omitted factors, such as the general state of the economy, in the use of 
                                                 
2 The @Risk software (Palisade 2008) was used to produce the simulation.   14 
information transferred from other settings so that the variables are proxies for the true 
values, in correlations between outcomes, in the treatment of secondary and external 
impacts, and so forth.  That estimate of fit is used through a transformation to adjust the 
model sum of squares from the Monte Carlo simulation to estimate the mean square error.  
The estimated mean square error can be used as an estimate of the variance of the random 
error.  This enlarges the overall degree of uncertainty without changing the mean value 
when a standard zero mean, normal error is assumed.    
 
Discussion of results: Secondary model with uncertainty 
 
The simulation result for the annual net benefits taking into account the variability in 
parameters and omitting pure uncertainty is presented in Figure 1.  The mean of the 
simulated distribution is $104 million, about $30 million higher than the mean of the 
point estimate.  The mean in the simulation differs from that in the models with point 
estimates because not all impact distributions were symmetric around their mean.  For 
instance, the revenue estimate has most of its statistical weight for values less than the 
most likely value used in the point estimates, and the unemployment benefits has 
substantial weight for a positive impact compared to the zero value used as the most 
likely estimate.  The 95 percent confidence interval is from minus $74 million to $280 
million with other statistics as reported in the figure.  Not reported in the figure is that 
there is a 17 percent chance of negative net benefits. 
 
Figure 1:  Simulation Results for Model with Secondary Impacts   15 
 
There are several ways to capture the influence of uncertainty within the benefit and cost 
impacts on the outcome.  Figure 2 reports a method based on regression coefficients 
between the values drawn from the distributions and the annual net benefits.  The impacts 
appear to fall into two categories.  The largest effects are due to the forecasts for external 
costs and for revenues.  The revenue forecast also drives several related impacts such as 
secondary tax and indirect consumer and producer surplus.  A smaller category of 
impacts includes the consumer distance benefit, the effect of unemployment, and the 
proportion of profit. 
 
These simulation results may suggest to decision-makers the wide range of possible 
outcomes, the possible shift in the mean due to varying models, and convey the sense of 
uncertainty compared to the potentially misleading precision that may be conveyed by the 
point estimates such as those in Table 1.   
 




The degree of uncertainty is expanded when a subjective measure of model fit is used to 
estimate a pure random error.  In comparison to results in Figure 1 with a 95 percent 
confidence interval from -74 to 280, the same confidence interval for the net benefit in 
the simulation model with added uncertainty is significantly expanded from -$172 
million to $381 million although the means, as designed, are essentially equal.  When the 
expanded error is included (not shown in any figure) there is a 27 percent chance that net 
benefits will be negative.   Including the random error component may be one way to 
offset the apparent tendency to underestimate uncertainty in decision-making and in 




A new area of research in benefit-cost analysis suggests that when a product is viewed as 
addictive, such as cigarettes, drugs, alcohol, or gambling; then there may be reason to 
adjust the observed behavior of those who are addicted to reflect the preferences of a 
non-addicted person.  The Australian Gambling Commission (1999, 2009) and Weimer, 
Vining, and Thomas (2006) use a similar linear model.   The latter authors empirically 
estimate the willingness to pay of those addicted to achieve an unaddicted state and 
estimate a downward adjustment for the modeled overconsumption of those who are 
addicted.  The estimated adjustment factor for cigarettes was that those who are addicted   17 
receive about two-thirds the consumer surplus of those who are not.  Grinols (2004) 
adjusts downward the average distance benefits by the estimated share of expenditures by 
problem and pathological gamblers; effectively reducing distance benefits by 30  percent.   
 
No additional adjustments for addictive preferences are incorporated here although the 
subject remains an area of possible research.  The substantial external costs reported in 
the models are essentially based on a cost-of-illness approach such as the dollar impacts 
in various categories affecting both problem and pathological gamblers (the addicted or 
potentially addicted).  These impacts are combined, often based not on willingness to pay 
but on the cost to various parties.  A willingness to pay by problem and pathological 
gamblers to avoid their state is presumably based on but not necessarily equivalent to 
these impacts.  Consequently it is believed that substantial double-counting would occur 
if the costs associated with problem and pathological gamblers are included as well as an 
adjustment for addictive preferences.  
 
Alternatively, there are several observations should one desire to make a downward 
adjustment to the results,   If the distance consumer benefit is reduced by about the one-
third, the amount suggested by Grinols or Weimer, Vining and Thomas, the adjustment is 
modest, about 8 million dollars.  Alternatively, if low prevalence of problem and 
pathological gamblers is applied to the average distance benefit without weighting for the 
larger expenditures of problem and pathological gamblers, then the change is less than 
one million dollars.   However, as a direction for further research it appears that 
distinguishing theoretically and empirically the benefits received by those who do not 
gamble, those who gamble normally, and problem and pathological gamblers may be a 
useful direction.  At the same time, consideration should be given to the extent to which 
such estimates are already partially captured in the costs estimated for external and 
addictive effects reported here. 
 
Distributional Impacts 
   18 
Federal guidance includes consideration of the distributional impacts of an activity if they 
are substantial stating “Your regulatory analysis should provide a separate description of 
distributional effects (i.e., how both benefits and costs are distributed among sub-
populations of particular concern) so that decision makers can properly consider them 
along with the effects on economic efficiency.” (OMB 2003).   There is substantial 
current interest in providing sensitivity analysis to the baseline guidance, in which dollar 
impacts to all those affected are weighted equally, in order to explore the impact of 
alternative distributional assumptions (Zerbe 2001 ;Adler  2008; Farrow 2010; HM 
Treasury 2009).  Although such adjustments have intuitive appeal, they are also 
inherently subjective as there is no known method to objectively determine such weights 
nor is there is a professional consensus on such weights.  
 
Gambling provides a likely area of application for distributional sensitivity analysis 
because low income and minority people are heavy participants in existing state 
sanctioned gambling in Maryland.  Carpenter, Perlman and Norris (2009) report zip-code 
data in which the codes in the lower quartile of income outspend on a per-capita basis 
those in the upper quartile by more than two to one although there is wide variation 
among various lottery type games.  In Maryland, 55 percent of households are in the 
lower quartile of income (Maryland Department of Planning, undated) so that population 
weighted impacts may be substantial. 
 
The approach to distributional benefits used here is that suggested by Farrow (2010).  
The U.S. Census Bureau (2008a, 2008b)  uses weights for inequality aversion (Atkinson 
weights) that imply relative weights of 2:1; ~4:1; or 14:1 between the upper and lower 
segments of the income distribution.  The actual weights in the ~4:1 case are 2.1 and .5 
respectively which are used to weight costs or benefits for either the lower or upper 
quartile  (Maryland (Maryland Planning Commission undated).  Those in the mid-two 
quartiles of income are given an absolute weight of one.  Implicitly, all other impacts 
except for the gambler’s benefits and costs are given an absolute weight of one.  
Distributional weights are applied only to the estimated Maryland source of revenues. 
   19 
Discussion of results:  Distributional Impacts 
 
The result of such weighting can drive the annual net benefits substantially negative as 
indicated in Table 2.  A distributional relative weight of 4:1 drives the point estimate of 
net benefits significantly negative, to - $171 million while relative weight of 2:1 for the 
highest and lowest quartiles is enough to almost exactly drive the net benefits to zero.  
Although equal weighting of impacts is the base case in benefit-cost analysis, the use of 
distributional weights changes the sign of the annual net benefits.  This indicates the 
substantial importance for economic analysis and presumably for decision-makers of the 







Table 2:  Distributional Impacts and Alternative Revenue Raising Policy   20 
Video Lottery Terminals
  e=.5 e=.25 Mil 2008 $
Benefits ~4:1 2:1 weight
Change Gov't Revenue $746 $746 Net Revenue 602
Change G: Annaul fee for 
Prob. Gamb $6 $6
Change PS: MD Profits $29 $29






Welfare benefits $827 $816
Costs    
Change Gov Rev (2% Admin) $22 $22  
Change Gov Rev: other cost $39 $39  
External and addictive costs $428 $428
Excess burden 
of tax 151







Welfare costs $998 $828
Annual Net Benefits -$171 -$13 -151
Extended model with                               
Distributional effects
Alternative Project:  Raise 




Alternative Policy: Raising revenue via the income tax 
 
The political debate focused on legalization of VLTs as a means to raise money for 
higher education and other purposes in a time of particularly tight state budgets hence the 
previous analyses focused on a with or without legal slots analysis.   However, some 
insight is gained by comparing the net benefits of VLTs compared to an alternative that 
would yield an equivalent change in net government revenue compared to the slots policy.  
A possible alternative policy is to raise existing sales or income taxes in Maryland.   The 
incidence of such a tax is assumed to fall entirely on Marylanders and no new good or 
service is being provided in direct exchange for the taxes as there is in the case of VLTs.  
Raising existing taxes is unlikely to impose substantially larger administrative costs given 
the existing tax collection system.  This alternative is thus the standard case of a transfer   21 
from taxpayers to the government with its associated excess burden of taxation, valued at 
25 percent of the funds raised as in previous models (Boardman, et al.).  Point estimates 
for such an alternative policy are presented in the final column in Table 2.  The 
alternative of raising taxes, without consideration of the specific uses to which the funds 
would be used, results in an estimated loss or (negative) net benefits of - $151 million.   
 
Discussion of results:  Alternative tax based model 
 
Standard taxation is thought to generate a welfare loss in raising funds, although the uses 
to which the funds are put may ultimately justify such loses.  Since the alternatives in this 
case, VLT gambling or raising taxes, are designed to generate the same net change in 
government revenue; the preferred alternative would be the lowest cost source of funding.  
Prior to distributional weighting, it appears that VLTs would be the lesser cost method of 
raising funds.  With  distributional weighting the result is less clear, although sales taxes 
themselves are understood to be regressive and the Maryland tax system exhibits only a 




Time has passed since the policy debates on which this benefit-cost forecast is based.   
Consequently it is possible to have initial “in medias res” feedback on the accuracy of the 
forecast and any generic issues in its production in order to inform future forecasts either 
of VLTs in Maryland or more generally, the production of benefit-cost analyses.  The 
issues raised to date include the general state of the economy, revenue forecasts, and the 
estimation of distance consumer surplus.  Each is discussed in turn. 
 
State of the economy:  The impact report was developed as the economy was softening 
and prior to the substantial changes in unemployment that evolved over the following 
year.  Consequently the Shinogle et al. report focused on the standard case of full 
employment even though supporters of government activity often cite employment as 
part of the benefits of an action.  In the Fall of 2010, with state unemployment about 7   22 
percent, analysts would be more likely to consider some partial and perhaps short term 
adjustment in benefits due employing previously unemployed labor.  The uncertainty 
analysis in this study did incorporate some probability of workers being drawn from the 
unemployed.  This case study demonstrates that uncertainty analysis for many projects 
may do well to consider the probability, even if small, for economic benefits from 
unemployed labor.   
 
Revenue forecast: The state of Maryland has accepted applications for slots at various sits.  
The demand for site licenses and VLT terminals has been less than expected with 
applications received for four sites not all of which were the anticipated sites, and for 
about half of the expected number of terminals as of Fall, 2010.  Although still early to 
know the full implementation results, these early applications suggest less demand than 
forecast by the state of Maryland (DLS  2008).   The observed demand in 2010 is more 
consistent with the medium or low predictions provided in Shinogle et al. although the 
cause may be different and is not yet known.  Shinogle et al. considered the source of 
lower revenue to be due to less play per machine and less recapture of Maryland 
gambling revenue that is currently spent out of state.  The current situation suggests, but 
does not prove, that the macro economic conditions and perhaps the less favorable terms 
demanded by Maryland may reduce revenue forecasts separately from the amount 
gambled per day or their source.   
 
Distance benefits: Measuring the consumer benefits of increased access to gambling 
remains a difficult empirical exercise.  However, it appears that the distance benefits as 
calculated by Grinols (2004) may have been incorrectly applied to the specifics of the 
Maryland case in Shinogle et al. including the change in distance traveled and the number 
of people to which the benefit applied.  Recalculation may increase the forecast of 
distance benefits from $25 to about $40 million.  This change would not have 
significantly affected the result but is an example that calculation error is often possible, 
and the risks of such error increase with the speed and perhaps decrease with the 
resources available to the analytical team. 
CONCLUSIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR RESEARCH   23 
 
This benefit-cost analysis can be viewed as an extension of a “real time” impact report 
for policy purposes.  The level of effort required was relatively modest and yields a 
comparable level of accuracy.  However, the benefit-cost framework informs several new 
issues including the net benefits to Maryland of VLTs, the importance of secondary 
impacts, the role of uncertainty, the comparison among alternatives, and the importance 
of distributional impact.  With a forecast in hand “as if” it had been produced in the Fall 
of 2008, there are lessons to be learned about considering the sensitivity to major 
uncertainties, in this case the macro state of the economy and the behavioral response of 
casino operators to the contractual terms.  As always, opportunities to consider major 
uncertainties and to develop evolved models depend on the time and resources available. 
 
This case study suggests improvements for monitoring and research.  As the revenue 
forecast and the external and addictive costs were the largest determinants of uncertainty 
their monitoring and more careful definition for benefit-cost purposes would be useful.  
The revenue estimates are expected to be relatively transparent but the external costs are 
much less transparent in their magnitude and causal link to changes in access to VLTs.  
Maryland does plan baseline and follow-up studies of the prevalence of problem and 
pathological gamblers but the analysis here suggests that much more than prevalence is 
desired.  For instance, the magnitude of incremental external and addictive costs could be 
investigated as well as the emerging method of assessing the willingness to pay of those 
with addictive characteristics.  Other areas for research and monitoring include:  1) the 
geographic source of gamblers, 2) the extent of secondary effects including hiring the 
unemployed, 3) what profits are retained in Maryland, 4) improving the gambler model to 
include those who don’t gamble, standard, and problem and pathological gamblers, and 
5) improvements in model uncertainty.  The monitoring and research associated with 
these issues can improve Maryland’s evaluation of the new program and inform 
continuing development of benefit and cost methods. 
 
What analytical conclusion is reached?  First, the benefit-cost analysis informs issues that 
are only implicit in an impact analysis.  It appears, based on a modest sized forecasting   24 
effort, that VLTs would have been forecast in 2008 to generate net benefits to the state of 
Maryland compared to the alternative of doing nothing and in comparison to raising 
funds through existing taxes.   There is substantial uncertainty about various point 
estimates so that there was some significant chance of negative net benefits based on 
information at the time of the elections.  Finally, the analysis makes clear that differing 
subjective weights on the distributional impacts of gambling can lead to an estimate with 
negative net benefits for VLTs.  For economists however, this is doubly uncertain 
territory both because of the subjective nature of distributional adjustments and because 
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